

## Outline

1. Introduction
2. Statistical Analysis
3. Production Simulation Analysis
4. Quasi-Steady-State Analysis, QSS
5. Operational Implications and Mitigation Methods
  - Terminology and validation of results
  - Relationships between analyses
  - Operational implications by time frame
    - Key findings
    - Evaluation of possible mitigation methods
6. Conclusions and Recommendations



## Operation Implications: Terminology and Validation

1-hr Delta: Change from the previous hour

- Schedule Flexibility

5-min Delta: Change from previous 5-minute period

- Load Following, Economic Dispatch

1-min Delta: Change from the previous minute

- Regulation

Validation:

Results


Selected examples from historical operations

Approach

Connections between historical performance and analyses




# Validation – Forecast Sample Day of CA Operation



# Validation – Schedule & Load Following Sample Day of CA Operation

July 19, 2004 Operation




# Validation – Interchange & Regulation


## Sample Day of CA Operation

July 19, 2004 Operation


Large ACE events tend to coincide with schedule changes.



# Validation – Regulation & ACE



## Validation – Regulation Procurement



## Operation Implications: Relationship between Statistics, MAPS Results and QSS Simulations

- Statistics provide insight into variability and what changes are due to intermittent renewables. Statistics don't tell whether the system will perform satisfactorily
  - 3 times standard deviation ( $\sigma$ ) is a proxy for maneuverability/flexibility requirements: the vast majority (99.7%) of events fall within  $\pm 3\sigma$  (in a normal population)
  - Increase in  $3\sigma$  is one measure of requirement for additional maneuverability/flexibility due to increased variability
- Economic simulations with MAPS identify the mix of resources available at any given time to meet the maneuverability/flexibility requirements
- Time simulations with QSS illustrate the relationship between the statistics and the minute-to-minute behavior of the system



# Operation Implications

- Highlight operational implications of variability (i.e., what did we learn?)
  - Day ahead commitment
  - Hourly flexibility
  - Load-following
  - Regulation
  - Show the relationship between the 3 classes of analysis
  - Examine one or two mitigation options that are (primarily) focused on the adverse implications of variability in a given time frame



## Change in Flexibility Requirements: Total Variability

	Total		
	$\sigma$ 1-Hour $\Delta s$ (MW)	$\sigma$ 5-Min $\Delta s$ (MW on 15-Min RA)	$\sigma$ 1-Min $\Delta s$ (MW from 15-Min RA)
2006 Load	1436	189.3	44.8
2006 L-W-S Change	15 (+1%)	0.3 (+0.2%)	0.1 (+0.2%)
Increased Requirement (3 $\sigma$ )	45	0.9	0.3
2010 Load	1575	207.6	49.1
2010T L-W-S Change	48 (+3%)	6.9 (+3%)	1.6 (+3%)
Increased Requirement (3 $\sigma$ )	144	21	5
2010X L-W-S Change	129(+8%)	14.2(+7%)	3.3(+7%)
Increased Requirement (3 $\sigma$ )	387	42.6	9.9

Variability for all hours of the year increases ~3% across all time frames.

Variability for all hours of the year increases ~7-8% across all time frames.



# Change in Flexibility Requirements: Total and Light Load (10<sup>th</sup> Decile) Variability

	Total			Light Load (10 <sup>th</sup> Decile)		
	$\sigma$ 1-Hour $\Delta s$ (MW)	$\sigma$ 5-Min $\Delta s$ (MW on 15-Min RA)	$\sigma$ 1-Min $\Delta s$ (MW from 15-Min RA)	$\sigma$ 1-Hour $\Delta s$ (MW)	$\sigma$ 5-Min $\Delta s$ (MW on 15-Min RA)	$\sigma$ 1-Min $\Delta s$ (MW from 15-Min RA)
2006 Load	1436	189.3	44.8	669	86.5	40.8
2006 L-W-S Change	15 (+1%)	0.3 (+0.2%)	0.1 (+0.2%)	30 (+4%)	2.7 (+3%)	0.1 (+0.2%)
Increased Requirement (3 $\sigma$ )	45	0.9	0.3	90	8	0.3
2010 Load	1575	207.6	49.1	734	94.9	44.8
2010T L-W-S Change	48 (+3%)	6.9 (+3%)	1.6 (+3%)	199 (+27%)	14.2 (+15%)	1.1 (+3%)
Increased Requirement (3 $\sigma$ )	144	21	5	597	42.6	3.3
2010X L-W-S Change	129(+8%)	14.2(+7%)	3.3(+7%)	347(+47%)	19.8(+21%)	2.9(+7%)
Increased Requirement (3 $\sigma$ )	387	42.6	9.9	1041	59.4	8.7



Increases in 1-hour and 5-minute variability for lowest 10% hours of the year are higher.

# 2010X vs 2020 Statistical Analysis: Total Variability

	$\sigma$ 1-Hour $\Delta s$ (MW)	Max, Min 1-Hour $\Delta s$ (MW)
2010 Load	1575	6714, -5617
2010T L-W-S	1623	6312, -5713
Change	48	-402, -96
2010X L-W-S	1704	7219, -5986
Change	129	505, -37
2020 Load	1977	8427, -7049
2020 L-W-S	2019	8747, -7351
Change	42	321, -302

Relative impact of intermittent renewable generation is less in 2020 than in 2010x case.




# Operation Implications: Day Ahead Forecasting

- Implications of not using forecasts
- Energy associated with forecasting error



## 2010X Load Forecast Error and Total Forecast Error *IGNORING* Wind and Solar Forecast

(Average +/-  $\sigma$ , Minimum, Maximum)




Failure to include intermittent renewables in forecast introduces large errors:   
 ~\$6.3B/year loss due to market inefficiency (in 2010T)

Forecasting increases value (i.e., reduces variable operating cost) of intermittent resources by ~\$170M/year.




# 2010X Load & Load-Wind-Solar Forecast Error (Average +/- $\sigma$ , Minimum, Maximum)



## 2010X Day-Ahead Forecast Error Duration Curves

All Years	MW
Load F-A (Sigma)	857
Wind+Solar A-F (Sigma)	1566
L-W-S F-A (Sigma)	1620

	Positive Energy (GWh)	Negative Energy (GWh)
Load Forecast-Actual	9612	-6442
L-W-S Forecast-Actual	19453	-13142
Wind Actual-Forecast	14723	-11583
Solar Actual-Forecast	1814	-1814




# Operation Implications: Unit Commitment and Schedule Flexibility

- Changes in commitment and dispatch
- Implications for schedule flexibility requirement and capability




## Commitment – Week of May 10th




# Dispatch - Week of May 10th

Hydro energy for May simulation same as May 2006




# CA Displacement - Week of May 10th




Hour-to-hour shifting of dispatch. Overall displacement is essentially all CC and Imports.



# 2010X Range Capability



## Schedule Flexibility: Committed Generation Range vs Maximum Hourly L-W-S Change



## Mitigation Methods: Unit Commitment & Schedule Flexibility

- QSS May example showed that changing commitment by substituting maneuverable units for fixed dispatch units would increase available range.
- Cost implications of displacement of lower cost generation vs. wind curtailment:
  - If de-committing base-load unit means that it will be off-line for an extended period (including higher price/higher load periods) then curtailing wind will probably be the lower total cost option.
  - However, if you expected to curtail wind for extended periods/large amounts of production, then de-committing base-load units will more cost effective.
- Providing deeper runback capability helps mitigate this problem, and eliminate the curtailment/de-commitment decision. Generators realize further benefits by avoiding start/stop costs.
- Storage reduces the need for these other mitigation methods; some storage technologies may provide benefits in other time frames.
- Short term modification of interchange schedule would provide similar benefits.
- Need for these mitigation methods drops as load increases.





## Operation Implications: Load Following Discussion


- MAPS & statistics correlation
- Implications for ramp rate capability




# 2010X Ramp Rate Capability




## Load Following Capability: Committed Generation Ramp Capability vs Expected Load Following Duty




# Load Following Capability: Committed Generation Ramp Capability vs Expected Load Following Duty (detail)




## Ramp Rate Down Capacity - Week of May 10th



# Ramp Rate Down Capacity w/o Conventional Hydro - Week of May 10th



## May Night: Impact of Wind Variability w/o PSH Steps



# Operation Implications: Implied Costs of Load Following Discussion

- Relationship to statistics on load following and economic dispatch
  - Year round incremental load following requirement is 3 x 14.2 MW per 5 minutes
  - If this incremental duty is assigned to regulation, then incremental regulation capability must cover 5 minutes of incremental LF
  - 3 x 14.2 MW of up regulation and down regulation
  - $43 \text{ MW} \times (\$28/\text{MW per hour up} + \$21/\text{MW per hour down}) \times 8760 \text{ hr/year} = \$18.5\text{M}$  or 48¢/MWhr
  - For 10<sup>th</sup> decile only
    - $(3 \times 19.8) \times (\$28 + \$21) \times 8760 \times 0.1 = \$2.5\text{M} = 7 \text{ ¢/MWhr}$
- Implications of curtailment strategies
  - Statistics and MAPS results suggest that curtailment is unlikely to ever be necessary for economically operated system.
  - Curtailment results in wind energy loss during periods of low spot price
    - Example: A 5% curtailment during all minimum load periods would result in ~300,000 MWhr of lost wind production. Average spot price is ~ \$23/MWhr, or about \$7M, or 18 ¢/MWhr.



## Mitigation Methods: Load Following

- QSS June example showed that imposing short term wind curtailment with rate limits on recovery relieves temporary depletion of ramp down capability
- QSS May night example showed that curtailment can increase available ramp capability
- Storage can increase available ramp capability; variable speed pumped storage can provide ramp capability during pumping
- Adding loads (e.g. controlled pump loads) has similar benefits





# Operation Implications: Regulation and CPS Discussion

- Statistics show an increase of 20 MW in regulation requirement
- Average cost of regulation (per CAISO data) is \$28/MW up, \$21/MW down
  - One MW-yr up is  $\approx$  \$245,000
  - One MW-yr down is  $\approx$  \$184,000
- 20 MW in each direction is a total of \$8.6M/year, or 22¢ /MWhr



## May Night: Impact of Wind Variability w/o PSH Steps



## CPS2 Discussion

- Minimum CPS2 is 90%, but is usually higher (i.e., better)
- For 2010T, the increase in 1-min delta  $\sigma$  due to intermittent renewables is 1.6 MW/min (from 49.1 MW/min to 50.7 MW/min).
  - 90% CPS2 would be expected to decline to 88.9%
  - 95% CPS2 would be expected to decline to 94.2%
- For 2010X, the increase in is 2.5 MW/min (from 49.1 MW/min to 52.4 MW/min).
  - 90% CPS2 would be expected to decline to 87.7%
  - 95% CPS2 would be expected to decline to 93.3%
- Without additional regulation, CPS2 performance would be expected to decline ~1-2% due to the increase in fast variability.

No additional regulation is expected to be required to meet 90% criteria if CPS2 is at least 91.1% (2010T scenario) or 92.1% (2010X scenario).



## Mitigation Methods: Regulation

- Production simulation showed a 1 MWhr increase of GT generation per 20MWhr of wind and solar energy
  - 1-min 3 sigma increase is 10 MW per minute
  - 5-min 3 sigma increase is 43 MW per 5 minutes
- Modern GTs have at least 10% MW/minute (from cold start) and 20-100% range per MW of nameplate (vs ~50-100% typical for existing fleet)
- Therefore, 100 MW of new GT would cover the system-wide increase of regulation due to all intermittent renewables in 2010X (10MW/min / 0.10 = 100 MW)
- And, 54 MW of new GT would cover the system-wide increase of load following due to all intermittent renewables in 2010X ( 43MW/0.80 = 54MW)

About 200 MW of new GT will meet all additional regulation and load following requirements for 15,000 MW of intermittent renewables

